Abstract. Computational trust is a central paradigm in today's Internet as our modern society is increasingly relying upon online transactions and social networks. This is indeed leading to the introduction of various trust management systems and associated trust models, which are customized according to their target applications. However, the heterogeneity of trust models prevents exploiting the trust knowledge acquired in one context in another context although this would be beneficial for the digital, ever-connected environment. This is such an issue that this paper addresses by introducing an approach to achieve interoperability between heterogeneous trust management systems. Specifically, we define a trust meta-model that allows the rigorous specification of trust models as well as their composition. The resulting composite trust models enable heterogeneous trust management systems to interoperate transparently through mediators.
Introduction
With people getting increasingly connected virtually, trust management is becoming a central element of today's open distributed digital environment. However, existing trust management systems are customized according to specific application domains, hence implementing different trust models. As a result, it is nearly impossible to exploit established trust relations across systems. While a trust relation holding in one system does not systematically translate into a similar relation in another system, it is still a valuable knowledge, especially if the systems relate to the same application domains (e.g., e-commerce, social network). This is such an issue that we are addressing in this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, little work investigates interoperability between heterogeneous trust models. The closest to our concern is the work of [19] , which describes a trust management architecture that enables dealing with a variety of trust metrics and mapping between them. However, the architecture deals with the composition at the level of trust values and do not account for the variety of trust models. In particular, one may want to differentiate between direct trust values and reputation-based ones when composing them. In general, what is needed is a way to formalize heterogeneous trust models and their composition. Such a concern is in particular addressed in [9, 21] , which introduce trust meta-models based on state of the art trust management systems. Nevertheless, little detail is given and the paper does not describe how to exploit the meta-model for composing heterogeneous trust models and this achieve interoperability. Dealing with the heterogeneity of trust models is also investigated in [4, 20] . However, the study is for the sake of comparison and further concentrates on reputation-based models. Summarizing, while the literature is increasingly rich of trust models, dealing with their composition remains a challenge.
Towards overcoming the interoperability challenge faced by trust management systems, this paper introduces a comprehensive approach based on the definition of a reference trust meta-model. Specifically, based on the state of the art (Section 2), the trust meta-model formalizes the core entities of trust management systems, i.e., trust roles, metrics, relations and operations (Section 3). The trust meta-model then serves specifying the composition of trust models in terms of mapping rules between roles, from which trust mediators are synthesized (Section 4). Trust mediators transparently implement mapping between respective trust relations and operations of the composed models. While this paper introduces the composition approach from a theoretical perspective, we are currently implementing it as part of the CONNECT project 1 on next generation middleware for interoperability in complex systems of systems (Section 5).
Trust Model Definition
As in particular defined in [5] : i.e., A trustor trusts a trustee with regard to its ability to perform a specific action or to provide a specific service. Hence, any trust model may basically be defined in terms of the three following elements:
1. Trust roles abstract the representative behaviors of stakeholders from the standpoint of trust management, in a way similar to role-based access control model [3] . 2. Trust relations serve specifying trust relationships holding among stakeholders, and 3. Trust assessment define how to compute the trustworthiness of stakeholders.
We further define trust relations and assessment below.
Trust relations
We identify two types of trust relationships, i.e., direct and indirect, depending on the number of stakeholders that are involved to build the trust relationship:
Direct trust: A direct trust relationship represents a trust assertion of a subject (i.e., trustor) about another subject (i.e., trustee). It is thus a one-to-one trust relation (denoted 1:1)) since it defines a direct link from a trustor (1) to a trustee (1). One-to-one trust relations are maintained locally by trustors and represent the trustors' personal opinion regarding their trustees [10] . For example, a one-to-one relation may represent a belonging relationship (e.g., employees trust their company), a social relationship (e.g., trust among friends), or a profit-driven relationship (e.g., a person trusts a trader for managing its portfolio).
Recommendation-based trust: As opposed to a direct trust relationship, a recommendation-based relationship represents a subject's trustworthiness based on a third party's opinion. This can be either (i) transitive-based or (ii) reputation-based.
Transitive-based trust relations are one-to-many (denoted 1:N). Such a relation enables a trustor (1) to indirectly assess the trustworthiness of an unknown trustee through the recommendations of a group of trustees(N). Hence, the computation of 1:N relations results from the concatenation and/or aggregation of many 1:1 trust relations. The concatenation of 1:1 trust relations usually represents a transitive trust path, where each entity can trust unknown entities based on the recommendation of its trustees. Thus, this relationship is built by composing personal trust relations [1, 18] . Furthermore, in the case where there exist several trust paths that link the trustor to the recommended trustee, the aggregation can be used to aggregate all given trust recommendations [7] .
Reputation-based trust relations are many-to-one (denoted N:1) and result from the aggregation of many personal trust relationships having the same trustee. Hence, the N:1 trust relation allows the definition of the reputation of each trustee within the system. Reputation systems may then be divided into two categories depending on whether they are (i) Centralized or (ii) Distributed. With the former, the reputation of each participant is collected and made publicly available at a centralized server (e.g., eBay, Amazon, Google, [14] ). With the latter, reputation is spread throughout the network and each networked entity is responsible to manage the reputation of other entities (e.g., [7, 23] ).
Trust Assessment
Trust assessment, i.e., assigning values to trust relationships, relies on the definition of: (i) trust metrics characterizing how trust is measured and (ii) operations for composing trust values.
Trust metrics: Different metrics have been defined to measure trust. This is due to the fact that one trust metric may be more or less suitable to a certain context. Thus, there is no widely recognized way to assign trust values. Some systems assume only binary values. In [24] , trust is quantified by qualitative labels (e.g., high trust, low trust etc.). Other solutions represent trust by a numerical range. For instance, this range can be defined by the interval [-1..1] (e.g., [12] ), [0..n] (e.g., [1, 18] ) or [0..1] (e.g., [7] ). A trust value can also be described in many dimensions, such as: (Belief, Disbelief, Uncertainty) [7] .
In addition, several definitions exist about the semantics of trust metrics. This is for instance illustrated by the meaning of zero and negative values. For example, zero may indicate lack of trust (but not distrust), lack of information, or deep distrust. Negative values, if allowed, usually indicate distrust, but there is a doubt whether distrust is simply trust with a negative sign, or a phenomenon of its own.
Trust operations: We define four main operations for the computation of trust values associated with the trust relations given in Section 2.1 (see table 1): bootstrapping, refreshing, aggregation, and concatenation.
The bootstrapping operation initializes the a priori values of 1:1 and N:1 trust relations. Trust bootstrapping consists of deciding how to initialize trust relations in order to efficiently start the system and also allow newcomers to join the running system Bootstrapping Aggregation Concatenation Refreshing One-to-One (1:1) X X One-to-Many (1:N) X X Many-to-One (N:1) X X X Table 1 : Trust assessment operations [16] . Most existing solutions simply initialize trust relation with a fixed value (e.g., 0.5 [6] , a uniform Beta probabilistic distribution [8] ). Other approaches include among others: initializing existing trust relations according to given peers recommendations [17] ; applying a sorting mechanism instead of assigning fixed values [18] ; and assessing trustees into different contexts (e.g., fixing a car, babysitting, etc.) and then inferring unknown trust values from known ones of similar or correlate contexts [16, 2] .
All the solutions dealing with 1:N trust assessment mainly define the concatenation and the aggregation operations, in order to concatenate and to aggregate trust recommendations by computing the average [18] , the minimum or the product [1] of all the intermediary trust values. In the case of Web service composition, some approaches (e.g., [15] ) evaluate the recommendation for each service by evaluating its provider, whereas other approaches (e.g., [11] ) evaluate the service itself in terms of its previous invocations, performance, reliability, etc. Then, trust is composed and/or aggregated according to the service composition flow (sequence, concurrent, conditional and loop).
Aggregation operations such as Bayesian probability (e.g., [13] ) are often used for the assessment of N:1 (reputation-based) trust relations. Trust values are then represented by a beta Probability Density Function [8] , which takes binary ratings as inputs (i.e., positive or negative) from all trustors. Thus, the reputation score is refreshed from the previous reputation score and the new rating [14] . The advantage of Bayesian systems is that they provide a theoretically sound basis for computing reputation scores and can also be used to predict future behavior.
Finally, refreshing operations are mainly trigged by trustors to refresh 1:1 and N:1 trust relations, after receiving stakeholders' feedback.
Trust Meta-Model
Following the above, we formally define the trust meta-model as:
where R, L, M and O are the finite sets of trust roles, relations, metrics and operations.
Trust Meta-Model Formalization
As detailed below, each set of T M consists of elements where an element can have a simple value (e.g., string) or a complex value. A complex value of an element is either an exclusive combination of values (only one of the values) ∨v (e.g., v 1 ∨ v 2 ∨ v 3 ) or an inclusive combination of values (one or more elements) 3v (e.g.,
Role set R: The role set contains all the roles r played by the stakeholders of the trust model. A role r of R is simply denoted by its name:
where: the attribute name of type string represents the name or the identifier of the role 2 . In our meta-model, a stakeholder is represented as a Subject s, playing a number of roles, r 1 , r 2 ...and r n , which is denoted as s r 1 , r 2 ...r n .
Metric set M:
The metric set describes all the trust metrics that can be manipulated by the trust model. A metric is formally denoted as a pair: m =< name:string, type:string >
where: name and type are strings and respectively define the name and the type. The type can be a simple type (e.g., probability([0..1]), label(good, bad), etc.) or a composition of simples ones (e.g., tuple (believe
Relation set L: A relation set L contains all the trust relations that are specified by the trust model. We specifically denote a trust relation as a tuple:
l =< name:string, ctx:string, type:string, trustor:∨r i , trustee:∨r j , value:m k > with r i , r j ∈ R and m k ∈ M
where: (i) name identifies the relation; (ii) ctx describes the context of the relationship in terms of the application domain (e.g., selling); (iii) type represents the cardinality of the relation and is denoted by one of the following arities: 1:1, 1:N or N:1; (iv) trustor and trustee are roles where a trust relation relates a trustor role with a trustee role; (v) value is an element from the metric set and thus reflects the trust measure given by the trustor to the trustee through this relation. In the above, note that different trustors can establish the same type of relationship with different trustees. Thus, as a trust relation is binary and between a trustor role and a trustee, the exclusive combination of roles (e.g., r 1 ∨ r 2 ∨ r 3 ) is used to describe these elements Operation set O: The operation set specifies the operations that can be performed over relations by a subject, either to assess the trustworthiness of another subject or to communicate (i.e., request/response) trust values associated with desired subjects (see Figure 1 ). As defined in Section 2, trust assessment relies on the bootstrapping, aggregation, concatenation and refreshing operations, whereas, the communication of a trust value relies on the request and response operations. An operation is formally denoted as:
o =< name:string, host:∨r i , type:string, input:3l j , output:3l k , via:3l n , call:3o >
where: (i) name identifies uniquely an operation; (ii) host instantiates the role(s) that hosts and executes the operation; (iii) type defines the operation (i.e., request, response, bootstrapping, aggregation, concatenation, and refreshing); (iv) input gives the trust relations that are required to perform an assessment operation or are received by a communication operation; (v) output gives the trust relations that are provided, as the result of either an assessment operation or a communication; (vi) via specifies the trust relationship that should hold with the role with which the communication happens, while its value is self in the case of assessment; and (vii) call denotes a continuation (see Figure 1 ). Note that input and output are complex values, i.e., logical conjunction of one or more relations. 
Trust graph T G:
We associate the definition of a trust graph with any trust model T M for the sake of graphical representation. Specifically, the trust graph T G(R, E) associated with a given T M is a directed graph with the vertices representing the set of roles R of T M , and the set of edges E representing the relationship between roles according to L. Hence, each edge is labeled by the referenced relation l from the set of relations L and the type of that relation, i.e., 1:1, 1:N or N:1.
Example
We illustrate the expressiveness of our trust meta-model by considering the specification of representative trust models associated with two selling transaction scenarios. Precisely, we introduce the specification of an eBay like centralized trust model (see Table 2 ) and of a fully distributed one (see Table 3 ). Both trust models aim at assessing transaction behaviors of sellers. Figure 2 depicts the trust graphs of both models; the centralized trust model, i.e., T M C (on the left in the figure), is defined with three roles, i.e., r S =Seller, r B =Buyer, and r M =M anager, whereas the distributed trust model, i.e., T M D (on the right in the figure), is defined with the unique role r C =Customer, which can be either a seller or a buyer.
Focusing on the specification of T M C in Table 2 , the roles Buyer and Seller have a direct trust relationship (i.e., l 0 ) with the M anager that manages the sellers' reputation (i.e., l 3 ). Thus, any Buyer can: (i) query the M anager about the reputation of a Seller (i.e., l 1 ), and (ii) provide the M anager with its feedback (i.e., l 2 ) after a selling transaction. Hence, a Buyer has to perform a request operation (i.e., o 4 ) to get the reputation of the seller, so that it can compute locally the trustworthiness of the seller (i.e., o 1 ). After a transaction is completed, a Buyer can provide its feedback to the M anager by triggering a request operation (i.e., o 8 ). The M anager in turn processes (i.e., o 9 ) this feedback request to compute and refresh the reputation of the concerned Seller (i.e., o 3 ).
Role set R r S = <name="Buyer"> r B = <name="Seller"> r M = <name="Manager"> Metric set M m0 = <name="Reputation", type="Probability"> m1 = <name="Recommendation", type="Probability"> m2 = <name="Rate", type= "Five Semantic labels"> Relation set L l0 = < name="ServerRecommendation", ctx= "Selling", type=1:1, trustor=(r S ∨ r B ), trustee=r M , metric=m1> l1 = < name= "SellerTrustworthiness", ctx= "Selling", type=1:N, trustor=r S , trustee=r B , metric=m1 > l2 = < name="BuyerFeedback", ctx= "Selling", type=1:1, trustor=r S , trustee=r B , metric=m2 > l3 = < name="SellerReputation", ctx= "Selling", type=N:1, trustor=r B , trustee=r M , metric=m0 > Operation set O o0 = <name="getManagerTrustworthiness", host=(r S ∨ r B ), type=request, in=l0, out=l0 > o1 = <name="assessSellerTrustworthiness", host=r S , type=concatenation, in=(l0 ∧ l3) , out=l1 > o2 = <name= "assessBuyerFeedback", host=r S , type=update, in=l2, out=l2, call=o8 > o3 = <name="setSellerReputation", host=r M , type=aggregation, in=l2, out=l3 > o4 = <name="getSellerTrustworthiness", host=r S ,type=request, via=l0, out=l1, in=l3, call=o1 > o5 = <name="getSellerReputation", host=r M ,type=response, in=l3, out=l3 > o6 = <name="sendSellerReputation", host=r M ,type=response, via=l0, in=l1, out=l3, call=o5 > o7 = <name="getBuyerFeedback", host=r S ,type=request, in=l2, out=l2 > o8 = <name="sendBuyerFeedback", host=r S ,type=request, via=l0, out=l2 > o9 = <name="updateSellerReputation", host=r M ,type=response, via=l0, in=l2, call= o3 > Regarding the distributed model T M D specified in Table 3 , the role Customer of the distributed model can maintain a direct trust relationship with other Customers (i.e., l a ) and can then ask trustee Customers to get their recommendation about unknown Customers that are sellers (i.e., l b ). Hence, a Customer can perform a request operation (i.
Role set R r C = <name="Customer "> Metric set M ma = <name="Recommendation", type="Probability"> Relation set L la = < name="DirectCustomer Trustworthiness", ctx= "auction", type=1:1, trustor=r C , trustee=r C , metric=ma > l b = < name="TransitiveCustomer Trustworthiness", ctx= "auction", type=1:N, trustor=r C , trustee=r C , metric=ma > Operation set O oa = <name="getLocalCustomerTrustworthiness", host=r C , type=request, in=la, out=la
, host=r C ,type=request, via=la, out=la > og = <name="setCustomerTrustworthiness", host=r C ,type=update, in=la, out=la, call=o f > o h = <name="updateCustomerTrustworthiness", host=r C ,type=response, via=la, in=la, call= og > 
Composing Trust Models
Given the specification of trust models, their composition relies on mapping their respective roles so that: (i) the trustworthiness of the various roles can be assessed, (ii) existing trust relations can be queried, and (iii) trust feedbacks can be propagated transparently from one trust model to another. Further, the existing trust relations and operations are extended to relate roles from the composed models, and new assessment operations are required to map trust relations from one model to another. Finally, the resulting mapping and extensions are implemented through mediation [22] so as to make composition transparent to existing systems, which leads us to introduce the corresponding mediator role.
Formally, the composition, denoted , of two trust models T M x and T M y , which introduces the trust model T M xy , is defined as follows: In the following, we elaborate on the mediation process to generate the sets of mediator roles, and mediation operations (i.e., µR xy , and µO xy ) and extended relations and operations (i.e., L 
Role Mapping
The mapping of roles from 2 distinct models is explicitly defined through a set of mapping rules defined as follows:
where, is asymmetric and maps the source role r s of T M s to the target role r t of T M t . We further refine into two mapping operators:
-The See operator, noted " ", simply associates a source role with a target role so as to define that the role r t of T M t is seen as The aim of relation mediation is to extend the trust relations of the original models to roles of the other. More precisely, for any trust relation: l =< name:string, ctx:string, type:string, trustor:∨r i , trustee:∨r j , metric:m k > of L x and L y of the composed models T M x and T M y , its trustee and trustor elements are possibly extended to account for mapping between roles.
Algorithm 2 details the corresponding extension where: (i) function e = v returns true if v is in e, and (ii) e vi ← − v j replaces the value v i in e with the value v j . As shown in the algorithm, the extension of trust relations depends on the type of the mapping operator. The See operator defines which local trustee (target role r t ) corresponds to the source role (r s ). Therefore, all the relations l i (from the source trust model) that consider the source role as a trustee (l i .trustee = r t ) are extended with the target role (see lines 2-5). The M imic operator introduces a new mediator role that plays trustees of the source role as a trustee in the source trust model, and plays the target role as a trustor in the target trust model. This leads to the corresponding extension of the trust models relations of L x (see lines 7-9) and L y (see lines [10] [11] [12] . Table 4 details the associated trust roles, metric and relations where new mediator role and extended relations are highlighted in grey. The composition relies on two mapping rules that allow a Customer of T M D to assess a seller of T M C . The rule using the See operator represents how sellers are perceived in T M D , while the second rule using the M imic operator introduces a mediator role that enables Costumers to request T M C as Buyers. Thus, "r B : T M C r C : T M D " leads to extend the trustee element of l a and l b by replacing r C with (r C ∨ r B ). The mapping rule "r C : T M D 1 µr r S : T M C " extends the relations that sink into the role Customer (i.e., l a and l b ) with the mediator role µr. In addition, all the relations that originate from the role Buyer (i.e., l 0 , l 1 and l 2 ) also originate from the mediator role µr.
Roles set R r S = <name="Buyer"> r B = <name="Seller"> r M = <name="Manager"> r C = <name="Customer "> µr = <name="Customer Mediator"> Metric set M m0 = <name="Reputation", type="Probability"> m1 = <name="Recommendation", type="Probability"> m2 = <name="Rate", type= "Five Semantic labels"> ma = <name="Recommendation", type="Probability"> Relation set L l0 = < name="ServerRecommendation", ctx= "Selling", type=1:1, trustor=((r S ∨ µr) ∨ r B ), trustee=r M , metric=m1> l1 = < name= "SellerTrustworthiness", ctx= "Selling", type=1:N, trustor=(r S ∨ µr), trustee=r B , metric=m1 > l2 = < name="BuyerFeedback", ctx= "Selling", type=1:1, trustor=(r S ∨ µr), trustee=r B , metric=m2 > l3 = < name="SellerReputation", ctx= "Selling", type=N:1, trustor=r B , trustee=r M , metric=m0 > la = < name="DirectCustomer Trustworthiness", ctx= "auction", type=1:1, trustor=r C , trustee=((r C ∨ r B ) ∨ µr), metric=ma > l b = < name="TransitiveCustomer Trustworthiness", ctx= "auction", type=1:N, trustor=r C , trustee=((r C ∨r B )∨µr), metric=ma > Table 4 : T M C and T M D Composition: Role, Metric, and Relation sets
Operation Mediation
Operation mediation serves translating request operations from one model into requests in the other model, according to the mappings between roles defined using the Mimic operator. More precisely, consider a request operation by r s for a relation:
<name="l", ctx="c", type="t", trustor="r s ", trustee="tee", metric="v"> of T M s where l ∈ L s , tor ∈ R s , while tee ∈ R t and r s :T M s 1 µr r t :T M t . Then, operation mediation first identifies the matching relations:
<name: string, ctx="c", type: string, trustor="r t ", trustee="tee", metric: m> of T M t that should be requested in the target model using a request operation of O t . Replies are finally normalized using the mediation operation given by µO xy for use in the source trust model. Operation mediation is practically implemented in a transparent way by the mediator that intercepts and then translates r s requests, as given in Algorithm 3. In the algorithm, the mediator interacts with r s (see lines 2-4) and r t (see lines 5-7). Then, the mediator computes the matching relation for each output relation (see lines [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] of the reply, where we assume that there is only one such relation (see lines 12-13) and requests its value using the appropriate request operation (see lines [16] [17] [18] . We further consider that the mediator (µr) embeds a library of mediation functions that translate and normalize heterogeneous trust metrics, which are invoked by mediation operations µo (see lines [12] [13] [14] . Finally, for each update (i.e., bootstrapping and refreshing) triggered by the response, as specified in the corresponding call element (see lines [19] [20] , the matching relations is sought in L t (see line 23) and its value requested (see lines 25-28).
Figure4 depicts the basic mediation process (left hand side) and its extension with update (right hand side), as performed by the mediator. First, the mediator receives the request in (step 1). Then, it invokes the corresponding request in the target model 
// The relation l * need to be requested
µo.host=µr ; µo.type="mediation" (steps 2 to 4) and upon receipt of the result, it normalizes the value using the mediation operation µO ts (steps 5-6). Finally, the reply out is returned. In the case of update (on the figure right hand side), the relation matching the one given as input is sought in the target model using the mediation operation µO st (step 2), leading to invoke the corresponding update operation of the target model (step 3).
As an example, Table 5 gives the operation set O 1,2 resulting from the composition of T M C and T M D .
Operation set O o0 = <name="getManagerTrustworthiness", host=((r S ∨ µr) ∨ r B ), type=request, in=l0, out=l0 > o1 = <name="assessSellerTrustworthiness", host=(r S ∨ µr), type=concatenation, type="product", in=(l0 ∧ l3) , out=l1 > o2 = <name= "assessBuyerFeedback", host=(r S ∨ µr), type=update, type="rating", in=l2, out=l2, call=o8 > o3 = <name="setSellerReputation", host=r M , type=aggregation, in=l2, out=l3 > o4 = <name="getSellerTrustworthiness", host=r S ,type=request, via=l0, out=l1, in=l3, call=o1 ∨ µo1 > o5 = <name="getSellerReputation", host=r M ,type=response, in=l3, out=l3 > o6 = <name="sendSellerReputation", host=r M ,type=response, via=l0, in=l1, out=l3, call=o5 > o7 = <name="getBuyerFeedback", host=(r S ∨ µr),type=request, in=l2, out=l2, call=µo2 > o8 = <name="sendBuyerFeedback", host=(r S ∨ µr),type=request, via=l0, out=l2 > o9 = <name="updateSellerReputation", host=r M ,type=response, via=l0, in=l2, call= o3 > oa = <name="getLocalCustomerTrustworthiness", host=r C , type=request, in=la, out=la > o b = <name="assessCustomerTrustworthiness1", host=(r C ∨ µr), type=concatenation, in=(la ∧ (la ∨ l b )) , out=l b , call=oc > oc = <name="assessCustomerTrustworthiness2", host=(r C ∨ µr), type=aggregation, , in=l b , out=l b > o d = <name="getRemoteCustomerTrustworthiness", host=r C ,type=request, via=la, out=l b , in=(la ∨ l b ), call=o b > oe = <name="sendCustomerTrustworthiness", host=(r C ∨ µr),type=response, via=la, in=l b , out=(la ∨ l b ), call=(oa ∨ o d ) ∨ o4 ∨ o7 > o f = <name="sendCustomerFeedback", host=r C ,type=request, via=la, out=la > og = <name="setCustomerTrustworthiness", host=(r C ∨ µr),type=update, in=la, out=la, call=o f > o h = <name="updateCustomerTrustworthiness", host=(r C ∨ µr),type=response, via=la, in=la, call= og ∨ µo3 > µo1 = <name="Translatel1l b ", host=µr,type=mediation, in=l1, out=l b > µo2 = <name="Translatel2la", host=µr,type=mediation, in=l2, out=la > Table 5 : T M C and T M D Composition: Operation set
The response operation o e should be able to assess Sellers of T M C since its outputs (i.e., l a and l b ) contain relations that sink into the Seller role (see Table 4 ). To do so, o e is extended (see lines [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] to enable the mediator role µr (when it performs this operation) to retrieve similar o e output relations in T M C , i.e., the relations l a and l b that are respectively similar to l 1 and l 2 . The operation o e can hence call o 4 or o 7 to search for l 1 or l 2 . Then, as for o e , the called operations are extended as well, by calling the mediation operations µo 1 and µo 2 to translate respectively l 1 and l 2 into l b and l a . Thus, o e is able to reply the appropriate trust relationships which are interpretable by Customers. Moreover, Algorithm 3 (see lines [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] enables Customers feedback to be propagated to the M anager of the target model T M C , so that the reputation of Sellers can be refreshed with the source model feedback. According to the resulting operation set (see Table 5 ), when the mediator role µr performs the response operation o h , it calls µo 3 to translate the feedback denoted by the relation l a into Buyer feedback, I.e., l 2 . Then, µo 3 is able to call o 2 with the l 2 to advertise its feedback to T M C M anager.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a trust meta-model as the basis to express and to compose a wide range of trust models. The composition of trust models enables assessing the trustworthiness of stakeholders across heterogeneous trust management systems. Such a composition is specified in terms of mapping rules between roles. Rules are then processed by a set of mediation algorithms to overcome the heterogeneity between the trust metrics, relations and operations associated with the composed trust models. We are currently implementing our approach as part of the Connect project 3 where we have defined an XML-based description of the trust meta-model, which we call TMDL (i.e., Trust Model Description Language). Thus, mediators are synthesized on-the-fly given the TMDL description of Trust models.
As future work, we are also considering the implementation of a simulator to a priori assess the behavior of trust composition of given trust models and thus allows fine tuning of the mapping rules. We are also investigating the use of ontologies to specify the semantics of trust model elements and thus possibly infer the mapping rules as well as infer the similarity of trust relations from the semantics.
